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There is a large literature evaluating the consequences of ﬁring costs on long-run labor
market outcomes. Its main purpose: To explain the diﬀerences in unemployment rates
observed between Europe and the U.S. While this an important objective and there has been
considerable progress in this line of research, this paper changes the focus of the analysis
and evaluates the eﬀects of ﬁring costs on business cycle dynamics. There are two reasons
for doing this. First, policy makers often justify introducing ﬁring costs as an eﬀective tool
for reducing the magnitude of economic downturns. Thus, it seems important to evaluate
the rationale behind this claim. Second, there are features of the data, besides long-run
labor market outcomes, that ﬁring costs might help explain. In fact, employment protection
levels do seem to be related to business cycle diﬀerences across countries: Figure 1 plots the
standard deviation of output against the employment protection level for seventeen OECD
countries, showing that they are negatively related. While this relation is highly suggestive,
it does not provide evidence that ﬁring costs aﬀect business cycle dynamics in any important
way. A third factor (e.g. high risk aversion) could be generating lower output ﬂuctuations and
leading countries to adopt higher employment protection levels. Thus, a negative relation in
Figure 1 could be obtained while ﬁring costs have no eﬀects. To determine the eﬀects of ﬁring
costs on business cycle ﬂuctuations, analysis is needed. This paper provides such analysis:
It describes a real business cycle model with establishment level dynamics, introduces ﬁring
costs and evaluates their eﬀects.
The model is a stochastic version of Veracierto [16], which in turn is based on Hopenhayn
and Rogerson [9]. The economy is populated by a representative household that values
consumption and leisure. Output, which can be consumed or invested, is produced by
a large number of establishments that use capital and labor as inputs into a decreasing
returns to scale technology. Establishments are subject both to idiosyncratic and aggregate
productivity shocks. In the benchmark case, both capital and labor are freely movable across
establishments.
Once the benchmark model is parametrized to U.S. data, ﬁring taxes ranging from one
month to one year of wages are introduced. The paper ﬁnds that ﬁring taxes have consid-erable business cycle eﬀects. In particular, ﬁring taxes equal to one year of wages reduce
the standard deviation of output by 10.7%, the standard deviation of investment by 14.7%
and the standard deviation of employment by 30.6%. Also, the ﬁr i n gt a x e sm a k ea g g r e -
gate employment more persistent: its ﬁrst order autocorrelation increases from 0.66 to 0.71.
These ﬁndings suggest that ﬁring costs could play a signiﬁcant role in explaining diﬀerences
in business cycle ﬂuctuations across countries.
This is not the ﬁrst paper analyzing the eﬀects of ﬁring costs on business cycle dynamics.
In a partial equilibrium setting, Campbell and Fisher [4] studied how ﬁring costs aﬀect the
aggregate behavior of a large number of establishments subject to idiosyncratic productivity
shocks and a shock to the aggregate wage rate. Their focus was on the volatility of job
destruction relative to the volatility of job creation, ﬁnding that ﬁring costs increase it.
Cabrales and Hopenhayn [3] analyzed a similar type of model except that the aggregate
shock was in the aggregate productivity level instead of the wage rate. Contrary to Campbell
and Fisher [4], they found that the ﬁring costs decrease the volatility of job destruction
relative to the volatility of job creation. This paper diﬀers from Campbell and Fisher [4] and
Cabrales and Hopenhayn [3] in that it performs a general equilibrium analysis where both
aggregate productivity and the wage rate are changing. In terms of the relative volatility
of job destruction, this paper obtains results that are closer to Cabrales and Hopenhayn [3]
than to Campbell and Fisher [4].
Current work by Samaniego [15] is more closely related. Samaniego also considers a
version of Veracierto [16] and performs a general equilibrium analysis.1 However, he stud-
ies how ﬁring taxes aﬀect the deterministic transitionary dynamics after a large persistent
change in aggregate productivity. This paper, on the contrary, computes the full stochastic
equilibrium of a real business cycle model. An advantage of this approach is that it allows to
evaluate how ﬁring taxes aﬀect standard business cycle statistics. Another advantage is that
it allows to assess the welfare beneﬁts of reducing business cycle ﬂuctuations. Despite the
diﬀerences, all these papers share a basic result: Firing taxes are found to lower the response
1The models diﬀer in that Samaniego [15] allows for endogenous entry and exit while this paper treats
them as exogenously determined. Another diﬀerence is that this paper gives ﬁrms a “quits allowance” before
being subject to ﬁring taxes, while Samaniego doesn’t.
2of the economy to aggregate productivity changes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. Section
3d e ﬁnes a competitive equilibrium and describes the computational strategy. Section 4
calibrates the benchmark economy. Finally, Section 5 introduces ﬁring taxes and evaluates
their eﬀects. An appendix provides the proofs to all the claims made in the paper.
2. The economy






t [lnct + v(lt)],
where ct is consumption, lt is leisure and 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor. Every period
agents are endowed with ω units of time. Given an institutionally determined workweek of
length equal to one, leisure can only take values ω or ω − 1.2
Output, which can be consumed or invested, is produced by a large number of establish-







where zt ∈ Z is an aggregate productivity shock, st ∈ S = {0,s min,...,smax} is an idiosyn-
cratic productivity shock, gt is capital, nt is labor, θ > 0, γ > 0,a n dθ+γ < 1. The aggregate
productivity shock zt ∈ Z, which is common to all establishments, follows a ﬁnite Markov
process with transition matrix H. The idiosyncratic productivity shock st ∈ S also follows
a ﬁnite Markov process, but with transition matrix Q.R e a l i z a t i o n so fst are assumed to be
independent across all establishments and st =0is assumed to be an absorbing state. Since
there are no ﬁxed costs of operation, establishments will exit only when their idiosyncratic
productivity becomes zero. Every period ν new establishments are exogenously born. The
distribution over initial idiosyncratic productivity levels is given by ψ.
2In order to analyze the eﬀects of ﬁring taxes it is important to assume that labor is indivisible: It allows
to associate changes in the labor input of establishments with changes in employment.
33. Competitive equilibrium
In this section I describe a competitive equilibrium where establishments are subject to
ﬁring taxes and the proceeds are rebated to households as lump sum transfers. Following
Hopenhayn and Rogerson [9], ﬁring taxes are modelled as a tax on reducing employment.
In particular, whenever an establishment makes its current employment level nt lower than
(1 − q)nt−1 i tm u s tp a yat a xr a t eτ on the diﬀerence. Observe that q is a policy parameter
specifying a contraction rate below which establishments are not subject to ﬁring taxes.
Hereon, I will refer to q as the “quit rate of workers”.3
In order to deﬁne a competitive equilibrium I will index the history of an individual
establishment by sa =( s0,...,sa) ∈ Sa+1,w h e r esj is the idiosyncratic productivity that the
establishment had when it was of age j. Also, the history of aggregate productivity levels
since date 0 will be denoted by zt =( z0,...,zt) ∈ Zt+1,w h e r ezj is the aggregate productivity
level that the economy had at date j.
Following Hansen [7] and Rogerson [14], I assume that agents trade employment lotter-
ies. This makes the preferences of the representative household linear with respect to the
probability of working ηt.4 The problem of the representative household at date 0 is then
given by the following equation:
max
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3The parameter q will be actually calibrated to the quit rate of workers since, in practice, establishments
do not have to pay ﬁring taxes on quits. Assuming a positive q is not only a considerable gain in realism,
but will make the problem of computing a competitive equilibrium tractable.
4In particular, α in equation (3.1) is given by v(ω) − v(ω − 1).
4b0 =0 , k0,a n dz0 given,
where kt is the capital owned by the household, pt(·,z t+1) is the price of an Arrow security
which delivers one unit of the consumption good if zt+1 is realized, bt(·,z t+1) are the purchases
of this type of security, wt is the wage rate, rt is the rental rate of capital, Dt are proﬁts and
Tt are the lump sum transfers from the government.
Establishments maximize expected discounted proﬁts net of ﬁring taxes. The problem of
an establishment of age a and idiosyncratic history sa (when the aggregate history is given



















































































































where f is the amount of ﬁring done by the establishment. Observe that the establishment
cannot reduce its employment level below its previous period employment level (net of quits)
without ﬁring workers and paying the associated taxes. Although the above problem was






=0 ,w h e na =0 , (3.5)
5since establishments are born with zero previous period employment. Also, observe that
at t =0 , establishments of age a and history sa take their previous employment level
na−1,−1(sa−1,z−1) as given.
In order to aggregate the behavior of all establishments it will be important to describe the
distribution µ of establishments across ages a and idiosyncratic histories sa. This distribution
satisﬁes the following equations:
µa+1(s
a+1)=Q(sa,s a+1)µa(s







Observe that the number of establishments of age 0 and productivity s0 is given by the
arrival of new establishments ν times the probability of drawing an initial productivity equal
to s0.





























This condition states that aggregate consumption plus aggregate investment must be equal
to the production of all establishments.
















That is, the total amount of capital rented by the establishments must be equal to the stock
of capital supplied by the families.






















since households are identical.
As was already mentioned, the government rebates to the households all the ﬁring taxes


















Finally, the proﬁts received by the representative household must be equal to the proﬁts












































3.1. A quasi-planner equilibrium
While the competitive equilibrium with ﬁring taxes described above seems a diﬃcult object
to analyze, it can be simpliﬁed quite substantially. It is straightforward to show that if {ct,
kt+1, ηt, gt, nt, ft, bt+1, wt, rt, pt, Dt, Tt}∞
t=0 is a competitive equilibrium, then {ct, kt+1, ηt,
gt, nt, ft}∞
t=0 solves the following quasi-planner problem:
max
(





















































































































=0 ,f o ra =0 (3.18)








T h ec o n v e r s ei sa l s ot r u e . I f{ct, kt+1, ηt, gt, nt, ft}∞
t=0 solves the above quasi-planner

















then {ct, kt+1, ηt, gt, nt, ft, bt+1, wt, rt, pt, Dt, Tt}∞
t=0 is a competitive equilibrium for some
{bt+1, wt, rt, pt,D t}∞
t=0.5
3.2. A recursive competitive equilibrium
In order to compute a competitive equilibrium it will be useful to work with a recursive
formulation to the quasi-planner equilibrium described above. Since the quasi-planner prob-
lem (3.12) is convex, establishments that have diﬀerent idiosyncratic histories and\or ages
but that have identical previous period employment and current idiosyncratic productivity
levels will be treated as being identical by the quasi-planner, i.e. they will be assigned the
same contingent employment plan.6 As a result, in the recursive formulation that follows,
I will index establishments by their previous period employment level u and their current
idiosyncratic productivity level s.
The individual state of the representative quasi-planner is then given by the stock of
capital k and a measure x describing the distribution of establishments across types (u,s).
5Appendix A provides a formal proof for this equivalence result.
6For a proof, see Appendix B.
8The aggregate state of the economy is given by the economy-wide capital level K,t h e
economy-wide distribution of establishments X, and the aggregate productivity shock z.
The problem faced by the representative quasi-planner is given by the following dynamic
programming problem:
v(z,K,X,k,x)= m a x
c,η,g,n,i
(

















γ − τ max[0,(1 − q)u − n(u,s)]
o
dx + T (z,K,X) (3.20)
Z
n(u,s)dx ≤ η (3.21)
Z
g(u,s)dx ≤ k (3.22)
k













τ max[0,(1 − q)u − N(u,s;z,K,X)]dX (3.25)
K








0)dx + χ(0 ∈ U
0)νψ(s
0) (3.27)
where χ is an indicator function that takes value equal to one if the argument is true and
zero otherwise. Observe that, aside from the aggregate state of the economy (z,K,X),
the representative quasi-planner takes the economy-wide employment decision rule N and
economy-wide investment decision rule I as given.




That is, the economy-wide decision rules N and I must be generated by the decision rules
n and i of the representative quasi-planner.
3.3. Computational strategy
Observe that, conditional on n, k,a n dz, the optimal capital allocation rule g is obtained
by maximizing aggregate output
R
ezsgθnγdx subject to the feasibility constraint (3.22).
Substituting this solution and equation (3.25) into equation (3.20) and then substituting the
resulting expression together with equation (3.21) into the one-period return function
R =l nct − αηt
allows to write the return function as a function of (z,K,X,k,x,N,n,i).








0) | z]} (3.28)
subject to equations (3.23), (3.24), (3.26) and (3.27).
The high dimensionality of the state space seems to preclude any possibility of computing
a recursive competitive equilibrium. However, two features of the problem will render it
tractable. The ﬁrst is the nature of the employment decision rule n. Appendix C shows that




   
   
¯ n(s;z,K,X,k,x),i f(1 − q)u>¯ n(s;z,K,X,k,x)
n(s;z,K,X,k,x),i f(1 − q)u<n (s;z,K,X,k,x)
(1 − q)u, otherwise

   
   
. (3.29)
Observe that the upper and lower thresholds ¯ n and n do not depend on the previous em-
ployment level u. The (S,s) nature of the employment decision rule is critical for making the
10decision variables in (3.28) ﬁnite dimensional: instead of letting the quasi-planner choose
a generic function n, there will be no loss of generality in constraining it to choose ﬁnite
dimensional thresholds ¯ n and n and deﬁning the employment decision rule n as in equation
(3.29).
The second property that makes the problem tractable is that, if the aggregate produc-
tivity z ﬂuctuations are suﬃciently small, along a stationary equilibrium the distribution x
will always have a ﬁnite support. To see this more clearly it will be convenient to consider
the deterministic steady state of an economy where the aggregate productivity level z is
constant and equal to zero. Hereon, any variable superscripted with a star (∗) will refer to
its corresponding deterministic steady state value. Before proceeding I state the following
result.
Proposition 3.1. In a deterministic steady state equilibrium, the invariant distribution x∗




























Proof: See Appendix D.
Hereon, I will assume that m∗ is a vector conveniently ordered. I will refer to m∗(j) as
the jth element of m∗ and the total number of elements in m∗ will be denoted by J.A l s o ,
it will be useful to classify the elements of m∗ into three sets: 1) those that correspond
to establishments that expand (set G∗), 2) those that correspond to establishments that
contract (set C∗), and 3) those that correspond to establishments that remain inactive (set




∗ (s) for some s ≥ smin
j ∈ C
∗, if m
∗(j)=( 1− q)¯ n
∗ (s) for some s ≥ smin
j ∈ I
∗, if m
∗(j)=( 1− q)m(j − 1) (3.30)
Observe that equation (3.30) deﬁnes an implicit ordering for m∗.
Suppose that, at some date t, the state variable xt has a ﬁnite support given by mt (and
the singleton {0}), that mt has dimension J (same dimension as m∗), that mt is close to m∗
and that
xt ({0},s)=x
∗ ({0},s),f o re v e r ys ∈ S (3.31)
xt({mt(j)},s)=x
∗ ({m
∗(j)},s),f o re v e r ys ∈ S and every j =1 ,...,J (3.32)
xt =0 , everywhere else.
In addition, assume that nt and ¯ nt are close to their steady state values n∗ and ¯ n∗.7 Then,
the next period ﬁnite support mt+1 will be given by
mt+1 (j)=

   
   
(1 − q)nt (s),i fj ∈ G∗
(1 − q)¯ nt (s),i fj ∈ C∗
(1 − q)mt(j − 1),i fj ∈ I∗

   
   
, for j =1 ,...,J, (3.33)
where s in the ﬁr s tl i n es a t i s ﬁes that m∗(j)=( 1− q)n∗ (s) and s in the second line satisﬁes
that m∗(j)=( 1−q)¯ n∗ (s).B yc o n t i n u i t y ,mt+1 will be close to m∗ and xt+1 will satisfy that
xt+1({0},s)=x
∗({0},s),f o re v e r ys ∈ S
xt+1({mt+1(j)},s)=x
∗ ({m
∗(j)},s),f o re v e r ys ∈ S and every j =1 ,...,J
xt+1 =0 , everywhere else.
7For s =0I assume without loss of generality that n(s)=¯ n(s)=0 , i.e. that the employment thresholds
are identical to their deterministic steady state values.
12Assuming that nt, ¯ nt, mt, kt, it, Nt, ¯ Nt, Mt, Kt, It ﬂuctuate in a small neighborhood
of their deterministic steady state values, the original representative quasi-planner problem
















   
   
(1 − q)n(s),i fj ∈ G∗
(1 − q)¯ n(s),i fj ∈ C∗
(1 − q)m(j − 1),i fj ∈ I∗

   
   
, for j =1 ,...,J,
k




   
   
(1 − q)N (s;z,K,M),i fj ∈ G∗
(1 − q) ¯ N (s;z,K,M),i fj ∈ C∗
(1 − q)M(j − 1),i fj ∈ I∗

   
   
, for j =1 ,...,J,
K
0 =( 1− δ)K + I (z,K,M).
where the decision variables n and ¯ n are deﬁned over s ≥ smin.8 The conditions for a recursive




The return function e R in (3.34) is given by the value of the return function R in (3.28)
that corresponds to the following variables: 1) the discrete distribution x is deﬁned by the
ﬁnite support m as in equation (3.31), 2) the employment rule n is deﬁned by the employment
thresholds n and ¯ n as in (3.29), 3) the discrete distribution X is deﬁned by the ﬁnite support
8Without loss of generality, n(0) and ¯ n(0) are set identical to zero. If τ is suﬃciently small relative to
the present discounted value of wages, this will always be the optimal choice.
13M,a n d3 )t h ee m p l o y m e n tr u l eN is deﬁned by the employment thresholds N and ¯ N.T h e
advantage of working with the transformed problem (3.34) instead of the original problem
(3.28) is that it has linear laws of motion. Since all the endogenous arguments of e R take
strictly positive values in the deterministic steady state, a second order Taylor expansion
around the deterministic steady state can be performed to obtain a quadratic return function.
This delivers a linear-quadratic recursive competitive equilibrium structure that can be solved
using standard techniques (e.g. Hansen and Prescott [8]). The assumption that nt, ¯ nt, mt,
kt, it, Nt, ¯ Nt, Mt, Kt, It ﬂuctuate in a suﬃciently small neighborhood of their deterministic
steady state values is satisﬁed in all the experiments reported in this paper.
4. Parametrization
This section describes the steady state observations used to calibrate the model parameters.9
Since the model will be calibrated to U.S. data and this economy is characterized by low ﬁring
costs, the parameter τ is set to zero.10 Given τ, the rest of the parameters to be calibrated
are β, θ, γ, ν, q, α, δ, the distribution ψ, the transition matrix Q for the idiosyncratic
productivity shocks, and the transition matrix H for the aggregate productivity shock. The
model time period is selected to be one quarter.
The ﬁrst issue that must be addressed is what actual measure of capital should the model
capital correspond to. Since the focus is on establishment level dynamics, it seems natural
to abstract from capital components such as land, residential structures, and consumer
durables. The empirical counterpart for capital is then identiﬁed with plant, equipment, and
inventories. As a result, investment is associated in the NIPA with nonresidential investment
plus changes in business inventories. The empirical counterpart for consumption is identiﬁed
with personal consumption expenditures in nondurable goods and services. Output is then
deﬁned as the sum of these investment and consumption measures. The quarterly capital-
output ratio and the investment-output ratio corresponding to these measures are 6.8 and
0.15, respectively. Since, at steady state I/Y = δ(K/Y ), these ratios require that δ =0 .0221.
9The calibration procedure follows Veracierto [16] quite closely.
10In the next section, the ﬁring cost parameter τ will be increased and its eﬀects analyzed.
14The annual interest rate is selected to be 4 per cent, which is a compromise between the
average real return on equity and the average real return on short-term debt for the period
1889 to 1978 as reported by Mehra and Prescott [11]. The discount factor β is then chosen
to be 0.99 in order to generate this annual interest rate.





matching the U.S. capital-output ratio requires choosing a value of θ equal to 0.2186. Simi-
larly, γ =0 .64 is selected to generate the share of labor in the National Income and Product
Accounts.
The disutility of work parameter α is an important determinant of aggregate employment
η.T h u s , α =0 .94 is picked so that 80 percent of the population works at steady state,
roughly the fraction of the U.S. working age population that is employed.
In turn, the quarterly quit rate parameter q is chosen to be 6 per cent, which is consistent
with evidence on quits from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) published
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The transition matrix for the idiosyncratic productivity levels Q is restricted to be a
ﬁnite approximation to a continuous process of the following form:
Π(0,{0})=1
Π(s,[smin, ˆ s]) =
1
ζ
Pr{(a + ρs lns + ε
0
s) ∈ [smin, ˆ s]},f o rs, ˆ s ≥ smin
where a, ρs and ζ are constants, ε0
s is an i.i.d. normally distributed variable with mean 0 and
standard deviation σs,a n dΠ(s,A) is the probability of transiting from s to a next period
value in the set A.11 We then have to determine the four parameters a, ρs, ζ and σs,t h e
idiosyncratic productivity levels {smin,...,smax} and the initial distribution ψ.S i n c ea l lt h e s e
parameters are important determinants of the establishment dynamics of the model, their
11Observe that Π is basically an AR(1) process truncated at the value of 0.
15values will be selected to reproduce several features of U.S. establishment dynamics.
One such feature is the distribution of establishments by employment size as reported
by the Census of Manufacturers. In particular, the distribution over initial idiosyncratic
productivity levels ψ is selected so that the invariant distribution x∗ in the model economy
mimics the average size distribution of manufacturing establishments across the census years
1967, 1972, 1977 and 1982, which is reproduced in Table 1. For this purpose, a total of
nine positive idiosyncratic productivity levels are introduced and their values {smin,...,smax}
are selected so that the (corresponding nine types of) establishments in the model economy
display employment levels in the middle of each of the employment ranges shown in Table
1.12
Another set of observations on (manufacturing) establishment dynamics pertains to job-
creation and job-destruction data. Davis and Haltiwanger [5] reported that, for the period
between 1972:2 and 1988:4, the job-creation rate due to births (JCB) was 0.62% while the
job-creation rate due to continuing establishments (JCC) was 4.77%. They also reported
that the job-destruction rate due to deaths (JDD) was 0.83% while the job-destruction rate
due to continuing establishments (JDC) was 4.89%.13 S i n c ee m p l o y m e n ti ss t a t i o n a r yi nt h e
model economy, the model can not match these exact job-creation and job-destruction rates.
Imposing the approximate symmetry observed in U.S. data, I chose instead to match the
following rates: JCB = 0.73, JCC = 4.80%, JDD = 0.73% and JDC = 4.80%. This gives
rise to three independent observations. In order to calibrate the four parameters a, ρs, ζ and
σs associated to the transition matrix an additional observation is then needed.
The last observation is obtained from Dunne et al. [6] who analyzed establishment
turnover using data on plants that ﬁrst began operating in the 1967, 1972, and 1977 Census
of Manufacturing. They found that the ﬁve-year exit rate among these establishments was
36.2%. Matching this exit rate, together with the job-creation and destruction rates described
above, requires the following parameter values: a =0 .05155, ρs =0 .996, ζ =1 .005 and
σs =0 .0372. The values for the idiosyncratic productivity levels {smin,...,smax}, the initial
12In practice, I normalized the lowest idiosyncratic productivity level smin to one and chose the endowment
of new establishments ν to make the nine employment levels fall in the middle of the employment ranges.
13These are all quarterly rates.
16distribution ψ and the transition matrix Q that correspond to this calibration procedure are
provided in Table 2.
Finally, the aggregate productivity shock is constrained to follow a standard AR(1)
process:
z




z is an i.i.d. normally distributed variable with mean 0 and standard deviation
σz.14 The parameters ρz and σz are selected so that measured Solow residuals in the model
economy replicate the behavior of measured Solow residuals in the data.15 Using the measure
of output described above and a labor share of 0.64, measured Solow residuals are found to
be as highly persistent as in Prescott [13] but the standard deviation of technology changes
is somewhat smaller: 0.0063 instead of the usual 0.0076 value used in the literature. As a
consequence, ρz =0 .95 and σz =0 .0063 are chosen here.
5. Results
5.1. Steady state eﬀects
This section reports the steady state eﬀects of ﬁring taxes in the deterministic version of the
model economy.16 Providing a steady state analysis is important because it describes how
the ﬁring taxes aﬀect the mean levels around which the economy ﬂuctuates.
Table 3 shows the eﬀects of increasing the ﬁring tax τ from zero to 0.33, one, two and
four quarters of wages.17 We see that the steady state consequences on the job reallocation
14Instead of selecting a ﬁnite approximation to this process (which would determine the ﬁnite set Z and
the transition matrix H described in the previous sections) I choose to work with the continuous AR(1)
process directly since the linear-quadratic computational method renders it tractable.
15Proportionate changes in measured Solow residual are deﬁned as the proportionate change in aggregate
output minus the sum of the proportionate change in labor times the labor share γ, minus the sum of the
proportionate change in capital times (1 − γ).
16This type of analysis is not novel. A number of papers have evaluated the steady state eﬀects of ﬁring
taxes in a variety of settings. Alvarez and Veracierto [2], Hopenhayn and Rogerson [9], Millard and Mortensen
[12] and Veracierto [16] are only a few examples.
17Firing costs equal to one year of wages amount to the severance payments that must be given to blue
collar workers with ten years of service in countries with the toughest legislation (Lazear [10]. That is, they
17process are quite signiﬁcant. In order to avoid paying ﬁring taxes equal to one year of wages
(τ =4 w), the job destruction rate of continuing establishments (JDC) decreases from 4.80%
to 2.74%. Since establishments prefer to wait until they exit before ﬁring additional workers,
the job destruction rate due to deaths (JDD) increases from 0.73% to 0.80%. In turn,
establishments that receive positive productivity shocks choose to reduce their employment
growth in order to avoid paying ﬁring taxes in the future. This leads to a reduction in the
job creation rate due to continuing establishments (JCC) from 4.80% to 3.05% and in the job
creation rate due to births (JCB) from 0.73% to 0.47%. The fact that establishments do not
respond to the idiosyncratic productivity shocks as much as they do in the absence of ﬁring
taxes leads to a signiﬁcant production ineﬃciency: Establishments with low productivity
levels end up employing too many workers and establishments with high productivity levels
end up employing too few workers. This production ineﬃciency induces agents to substitute
away from market activities towards leisure, leading to a decrease of 2.46% in aggregate
employment. The lower productivity and employment levels in turn lead to a decrease of
3.52% in output, consumption, capital and investment.
T h el a s tr o wo fT a b l e3s h o w st h ew e l f a r ee ﬀects. In particular, it reports the propor-
tionate increase in consumption that must be given to the representative agent living in the
steady state with ﬁr i n gt a x e st om a k eh i mi n d i ﬀerent with being in the steady state with
no ﬁring taxes. Since the economy without ﬁring taxes is Pareto optimal, we know that
this compensation must be positive. In fact, Table 3 shows that it can be a large number:
According to this measure, the welfare cost of introducing a ﬁring tax equal to one year of
wages is equal to 1.74% of consumption.18
5.2. Business cycle eﬀects
This section constitutes the core of the paper. It analyzes the eﬀects of ﬁring taxes on busi-
ness cycle dynamics. Before proceeding to the main results, it will be important to determine
represent an upper bound on what is empirically reasonable.
18This paper obtains a lower welfare cost than Veracierto [16] because it provides a quits allowance before
taxing ﬁring, while Veracierto [16] doesn’t. As a consequence, the ﬁring taxes have smaller eﬀects.
18the empirical plausibility of the business cycles generated by the benchmark economy with
zero ﬁring costs that was calibrated in Section 4. The ﬁrst and second columns of Table 4
report business cycle statistics for the U.S. and the benchmark economy (τ =0 ), respec-
tively. Before any statistics were computed, all time series were logged and detrended using
the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. The empirical measures of output, investment and consumption
reported in the table correspond to the measures described in Section 4, and cover the period
between 1960:1 and 1993:4. For the model economy, time series of length equal to 136 peri-
ods (the same length as the U.S. series) were computed for 100 simulations and the reported
statistics are averages across these simulations. Comparing the business cycles generated by
both economies, Table 4 shows that output ﬂuctuates roughly the same amount in the model
as in the U.S. Investment is about 5 times more variable than output in the model, while it
is about 4 times as variable in the data. Consumption is less variable than output in both
economies, however, it is less variable in the model than in the U.S. The aggregate stock of
capital varies about the same amount in both economies. Hours vary less than output in
the model, while they vary slightly more than output in the data. Similarly, productivity
ﬂuctuates less in the model than in the U.S. In terms of correlations with output, we see that
almost all variables are highly procyclical, both in the model and in U.S. data. The only
exceptions are capital (which is acyclical both in the model and the U.S.) and productivity
(which is highly procyclical in the model, but acyclical in the data). Overall, the bench-
mark economy is found to be broadly consistent with salient features of U.S. business cycle
dynamics, similarly to previous RBC models in the literature.
Having established the empirical plausibility of the benchmark economy, I now turn to
evaluate the eﬀects of ﬁring costs on business cycle dynamics. The last three columns show
the results. We see that introducing ﬁring costs equal to one year of wages has considerable
eﬀects: The standard deviation of output decreases by 10.7% (from 1.40 to 1.25). The
expenditures components also become less variable, but by diﬀerent amounts: The standard
deviation of consumption decreases by 4.1% (from 0.49 to 0.47) while the standard deviation
of investment decreases by 14.7% (from 7.07 to 6.03). These are signiﬁcant eﬀects. However,
they are relatively small compared to the eﬀects on employment, whose standard deviation
decreases by 30.6% (from 0.98 to 0.68). In terms of comovements with output, the eﬀects
19of ﬁring taxes are generally insigniﬁcant. The only sizable eﬀect is on labor productivity,
whose correlation with output increases from 0.91 to 0.99.
The intuition for why ﬁring taxes reduce the variability of aggregate employment by such
a considerable amount is straightforward. The presence of ﬁring taxes leads establishments
to follow the (S,s) decision rule given by equation (3.29). As a consequence, an establishment
that has a previous employment level net of quits (1 − q)u between its lower employment
threshold n and its upper employment threshold ¯ n chooses to remain inactive, that is, it
makes its current employment equal to its previous employment level net of quits (1 − q)u.
Since the employment level of an inactive establishment does not respond to aggregate
conditions, the mere upsurge of this type of establishments leads to a reduction in the
variability of aggregate employment.
The ranges of inaction also lowers the employment variability of active establishments.
The reason is that an establishment that adjusts its employment level at a time of a positive
aggregate shock will be concerned that, in the future, it may enter a long period of inaction
during which aggregate productivity will revert to its mean. If the establishment responds
too much to the current aggregate productivity shock it may ﬁnd itself with an employment
level that is too high for the aggregate productivity levels that will hold later on. For this
reason, active establishments reduce the response of their employment levels n and ¯ n to the
aggregate productivity shocks, dampening the ﬂuctuations in aggregate employment.
Table 5 shows the eﬀects of ﬁring taxes on the persistence of aggregate employment. In
particular, it reports the autocorrelation of aggregate employment at lags that vary between
one and ﬁve quarters. We see that the autocorrelation at a one quarter lag increases from
0.66 to 0.71 when ﬁring taxes equal to one year of wages (τ =4 w) are introduced.
The eﬀects are even larger at higher lags. For example, the autocorrelation at a three quarters
lag increases from 0.20 to 0.27. These are signiﬁcant eﬀects. The reason for why ﬁring taxes
increase the persistence of aggregate employment can be found in the creation of the ranges of
inaction. If an establishment enters a range of inaction after having expanded its employment
level in response to an aggregate productivity shock, the eﬀects of the expansion will persist
until the establishment comes out of the range of inaction and adjusts its employment again.
Thus the presence of inactive establishments makes aggregate employment more persistent.
20Table 6 reports the eﬀects of ﬁring taxes on the cyclical behavior of job creation and job
destruction. We see that when the ﬁring taxes are equal to zero, the job creation rate and
the job destruction rate vary by the same amount and are negatively correlated.19 When
the ﬁring taxes are introduced, the job creation rate and job destruction rates become less
variable and less negatively correlated. An interesting feature in Table 6 is that the ﬁring
taxes decrease the variability of job destruction more than the variability of job creation.
This ﬁnding seems to contradict Campbell and Fisher [4], who report that introducing ﬁring
costs increase the relative variability of job destruction. However, Campbell and Fisher
perform a partial equilibrium analysis where the only source of ﬂuctuations is a wage shock.
Aggregate productivity, which is the source of aggregate ﬂuctuations in this paper, is left
unchanged. This is an important diﬀerence. Cabrales and Hopenhayn [3] ﬁnd, in a partial
equilibrium setting, that ﬁring costs increase the relative variability of job creation when the
source of the ﬂuctuations is an aggregate productivity shock instead of the wage rate.
A ni n t e r e s t i n gf e a t u r ei nT a b l e s4 ,5a n d6i st h a te v e nl o wl e v e l so fﬁring taxes can have
substantial eﬀects on business cycle dynamics. In particular, ﬁring taxes equal to one quarter
of wages (τ = w) are found to reduce the standard deviations of output, investment and
labor 70% as much as ﬁring taxes equal to one year of wages (τ =4 w). The similarities are
even stronger when considering the eﬀects on the autocorrelation of aggregate employment,
and the cyclical behavior job creation and job destruction. The reasons for why small ﬁring
taxes can have such signiﬁcant eﬀects are familiar to the literature. For example, in the
investment decision problem analyzed by Abel and Eberly [1] the derivative of the range of
inaction with respect to the wedge between the purchase and resale price of capital is shown
to be inﬁnite when the wedge is equal to zero. In this paper, the ranges of inaction are
created by a ﬁring tax but the mechanism is the same: Small ﬁring taxes have large eﬀects
on the length of the ranges of inaction. Through their eﬀects on the ranges of inaction, the
small ﬁring taxes have important consequences for the aggregate ﬂuctuations of the economy.
19The fact that the job destruction rate is more variable than the job creation rate in U.S. data is not
particularly worrisome. Veracierto (1995) shows that incorporating a reallocation shock that is correlated
with the aggregate productivity shock can reproduce that particular feature of U.S. data. However, the
reallocation shock has no important eﬀects on aggregate ﬂuctuations.
21Observe that, by reducing aggregate ﬂuctuations, the welfare costs of ﬁring taxes could
be lower than those estimated from comparing steady states. However, this eﬀect turns out
to be negligible: Once the business cycle consequences are taken into account, the welfare
costs of ﬁring taxes are virtually the same as those reported in Table 3. There are two
reasons for this. First, most of the reduction in variability takes place in employment. Since
the preferences of the representative agent are linear with respect to this component, there
a r en ow e l f a r eg a i n sf r o mt h i se ﬀect. Second, the volatility of consumption decreases but by
a very small amount. This small eﬀect, together with the relatively low risk aversion of the
representative agent, produces an extremely small welfare gain.
5.3. No tax Rebates
So far, the ﬁring taxes have been rebated to the representative household as a lump sum
transfer. However, many of the ﬁring costs paid by employers in actual countries do not go to
the workers but involve resources that are wasted: Procedural requirements and legal costs
are examples. To assess the eﬀe c t so ft h i st y p eo fﬁring costs, this section analyzes ﬁring
taxes that are thrown into the ocean. In particular, it analyzes a social planner problem
given by maximizing equation (3.12) subject to equations (3.13) through (3.18), but where
the lump-sum transfers Tt (zt) in equation (3.13) are set to zero.
Table 7 reports the steady state results. Not surprisingly, the eﬀects of ﬁring taxes on
the job creation and destruction process are the same as when the ﬁring taxes are rebated
as lump sum transfers. However, there are important diﬀerences in the rest of the variables.
In particular, ﬁring taxes equal to one year of wages (τ =4 w) reduce employment by only
0.28%, compared to the 2.46% drop reported in Table 3. The reason is that when the ﬁring
taxes are not rebated to the household sector, they generate a large income eﬀect. This eﬀect
cancels the substitution eﬀect from the lower wages and leads to a small change in labor
supply. Despite the small drop in employment, consumption decreases quite considerably
because part of the output is used up in ﬁring workers. Since both consumption and leisure
are smaller than when the ﬁring taxes are rebated as lump-sum transfers, the welfare costs
are much larger: 3.84% instead of 1.74%.
Table 8 reports the business cycle eﬀects. We see that the business cycle ﬂuctuations are
22virtually the same when the tax revenues are rebated to the households sector as when they
are not (Table 4). There are two reasons for this. First, total tax revenues are small: Even
when τ is equal to one year of wages and the tax revenues are the largest, they represent
only 1.86% of aggregate output (Tables 3 and 7). Second, the tax revenues ﬂuctuate very
little: When τ is equal to one year of wages, their standard deviation is only 0.50. Since the
tax revenues are small and ﬂuctuate very little, it makes no diﬀerence if they are rebated to
the households or not: They do not represent a signiﬁcant source of aggregate ﬂuctuations.
We conclude that determining to what extent the ﬁring taxes are rebated to the household
sector is crucial for evaluating their long-run outcomes, but has no importance for analyzing
their business cycle eﬀects.












































be the Lagrange multipliers for equations (3.2)-(3.4), respectively. The ﬁrst order conditions

















































































































































































































































be the Lagrange multipliers for equations (3.13)-(3.17), respectively. The ﬁrst order condi-
tions for a quasi-planner equilibrium are then given by equations (A.1)-(A.9) and equations
(3.13)-(3.19).
Establishing that quasi-planner and competitive equilibria are equivalent then amounts
to showing that equations (3.2)-(3.11) are satisﬁed if and only if equations (3.13)-(3.19) hold.
This is a straightforward veriﬁcation.
24B. Determination of the individual state of an establishment
Proposition B.1. Let (h,sh) be the age and the idiosyncratic history of a particular type
of establishment at date 0.L e t (j,sj) be the age and the idiosyncratic history of another












and that sh = sj.
Then, the solution {ˆ ct, ˆ kt+1, ˆ ηt, ˆ gt, ˆ nt, ˆ ft}∞








































































































































































































































µh+t ((sh,s t)) + µj+t ((sj,s t))
.
Consider an alternative contingent plan {e kt+1, e ηt, e gt, e nt, e ft}∞
t=0 which is identical to the












































































































This alternative plan is feasible and, by the strict concavity of the establishment level
production function, it leads to a larger right hand side to equation (3.13) for every zt.
Hence, consumption can be made larger than under the optimal plan (strictly larger at some
zt) while aggregate employment is left unchanged. This increases expected utility, leading
to a contradiction.
26C. Characterization of the optimal employment rule




















































































































Under a recursive formulation, φa,t (sa,zt), Ωa,t (sa,zt) and na,t (sa,zt) will depend on
(u,s;z,K,X,k,x),w h e r eu is the previous period employment na−1,t−1 (sa−1,zt−1) and s is
the current idiosyncratic productivity level sa, while wt (zt), rt (zt),a n dpt (zt+1) will depend
on (z,K,X,k,x). Abusing notation, for s>0, we can rewrite equation (C.5) as follows:

















































is strictly increasing in u,t h es o l u t i o nφ to the functional equation given by (C.6) and (C.7)
will be increasing in u. As a consequence, there exists a unique ¯ n(s;z,K,X,k,x) satisfying























































Observe that n(s;z,K,X,k,x) < ¯ n(s;z,K,X,k,x).
Since
n(u,s;z,K,X,k,x) > (1 − q)u =⇒ φ(u,s;z,K,X,k,x)=0 ,
20This is true if τ is suﬃciently small relative to the present discounted value of wages
28n(u,s;z,K,X,k,x) < (1 − q)u =⇒ φ(u,s;z,K,X,k,x)=τ,






























equations (C.8) and (C.9), together with the fact that φ is increasing in u,i m p l yt h ee m -
ployment decision rule (3.29).
D. Support of invariant distribution
Proof of Proposition 3.1: That 0 b e l o n g st ot h es u p p o r tf o l l o w sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a t
new establishments are born with zero previous period employment and from the fact that
establishments that die (i.e transit to s =0 ) choose zero employment level.
That the set m∗ b e l o n g st ot h es u p p o r tf o l l o w sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a te v e r yt i m et h a ta n
establishment of type (u,s) has a next period number of agents diﬀerent from n0 =( 1−q)u
it must be n0 =( 1− q)n∗ (s), if the establishment expands, or n0 =( 1− q)¯ n∗ (s),i ft h e
establishment contracts. Observe that Ω(s) is an upper-bound on the duration of inaction
for an establishment that has just expanded (and has current idiosyncratic productivity
s ≥ smin). Similarly, ¯ Ω(s) is an upper-bound on the duration of inaction for an establishment
that has just contracted (and has current idiosyncratic productivity s ≥ smin).
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s0 =0 .00 s1 =1 .00 s2 =1 .11 s3 =1 .26 s4 =1 .40
s5 =1 .58 s6 =1 .76 s7 =1 .94 s8 =2 .18 s9 =2 .53
Initial distribution:
ψ0 =0 .00 ψ1 =0 .50 ψ2 =0 .15 ψ3 =0 .35 ψ4 =0 .00




                       

1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.088 0.847 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.005 0.084 0.879 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.005 0.000 0.086 0.847 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.005 0.000 0.000 0.088 0.876 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.846 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.092 0.808 0.095 0.000 0.000
0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.094 0.873 0.028 0.000
0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.096 0.895 0.004
0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.099 0.896





τ =0 τ =0 .33w τ = w τ =2 w τ =4 w
output 100.00 99.13 98.38 97.65 96.48
consumption 100.00 99.13 98.38 97.65 96.48
investment 100.00 99.13 98.38 97.65 96.48
capital 100.00 99.13 98.38 97.65 96.48
labor 100.00 99.31 98.99 98.55 97.54
taxes/output 0.0% 0.49% 0.78% 1.13% 1.86%
JCB 0.73% 0.66% 0.58% 0.53% 0.47%
JCC 4.80% 3.71% 3.17% 3.05% 3.05%
JDD 0.73% 0.77% 0.79% 0.80% 0.80%
JDC 4.80% 3.61% 2.96% 2.79% 2.74%
Welfare cost 0.00% 0.35% 0.88% 1.30% 1.74%
32Table 4
Business cycle eﬀects
U.S. data τ =0 τ =0 .33w τ = w τ =2 w τ =4 w
A: Standard deviations
output 1.33 1.40 1.35 1.29 1.26 1.25
consumption 0.87 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.47
investment 4.99 7.07 6.72 6.32 6.12 6.03
capital 0.63 0.50 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.45
labor 1.42 0.98 0.88 0.77 0.71 0.68
productivity 0.76 0.49 0.52 0.55 0.57 0.58
taxes n.a. n.a. 2.27 1.27 0.71 0.50
B: Correlations with output
output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
consumption 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93
investment 0.91 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
capital 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
labor 0.85 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
productivity -0.16 0.91 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.99
taxes n.a. n.a. 0.26 0.20 0.29 0.54
33Table 5
Employment autocorrelation function
τ =0 τ =0 .33w τ = w τ =2 w τ =4 w
1q u a r t e r 0.66 0.69 0.71 0.71 0.71
2q u a r t e r s 0.40 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.47
3q u a r t e r s 0.20 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.27
4q u a r t e r s 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.09
5q u a r t e r s -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04
34Table 6
J o bc r e a t i o na n dj o bd e s t r u c t i o nﬂuctuations
U.S. τ =0 τ =0 .33w τ = w τ =2 w τ4w
σ(JC) 0.88 0.44 0.39 0.34 0.32 0.31
σ(JD) 1.65 0.44 0.37 0.30 0.28 0.27
corr(JC, JD) -0.37 -0.60 -0.60 -0.57 -0.57 -0.56
35Table 7
Steady state eﬀects - No tax rebates
τ =0 τ =0 .33w τ = w τ =2 w τ =4 w
output 100.00 99.60 99.12 98.72 98.25
consumption 100.00 99.03 98.22 97.41 96.10
investment 100.00 99.60 99.12 98.72 98.25
capital 100.00 99.60 99.12 98.72 98.25
labor 100.00 99.88 99.90 99.88 99.72
taxes/output 0.0% 0.49% 0.78% 1.13% 1.86%
JCB 0.73% 0.66% 0.58% 0.53% 0.47%
JCC 4.80% 3.71% 3.17% 3.05% 3.05%
JDD 0.73% 0.77% 0.79% 0.80% 0.80%
JDC 4.80% 3.61% 2.96% 2.79% 2.74%
Welfare cost 0.00% 0.89% 1.74% 2.56% 3.84%
36Table 8
Business cycle eﬀects - No tax rebates
U.S. data τ =0 τ =0 .33w τ = w τ =2 w τ =4 w
A: Standard deviations
output 1.33 1.40 1.35 1.29 1.26 1.24
consumption 0.87 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.47
investment 4.99 7.07 6.74 6.32 6.14 6.02
capital 0.63 0.50 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.45
labor 1.42 0.98 0.88 0.77 0.71 0.68
productivity 0.76 0.49 0.52 0.55 0.57 0.58
taxes n.a. n.a. 2.28 1.27 0.72 0.50
B: Correlations with output
output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
consumption 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93
investment 0.91 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
capital 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08
labor 0.85 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
productivity -0.16 0.91 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.99
taxes n.a. n.a. 0.26 0.20 0.28 0.54
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